ENGLAND UNDER ANDRA VÄRLDSKRIGET

Ur "The Transition Handbook" av Rob Hopkins:

"Can we learn anything useful from Britains last 'wartime mobilisation'?

Can any lessons be learned from  Britain's most recent national 'Powerdown', World War II? While there are clearly many differences with the kind of proactive energy-descent planning this book advocates, there are also relevant similarities. We are clearly a very different society now, with different skills, expectations and values, and the nature of the challenge facing us is very different; yet even so, a look back to that time can be instructive. As Andrew Simmons of the New Economics Foundation observes

'Recent history demonstrates that whole economies can be re-geared in short periods of time, which is exactly the demand global warming makes of us... Could it be that the experience of social and military mobilisation in wartime might answear the biggest question to do with global warming: we are capable of changing our lifestyles and economies enough and in time to stop it?'

There is much that can be learned from both the run-up to the war and from the 1939-45 period itself. In the light of the need for broad engagement across sectors in response to a life-threathening situation, we can learn some lessons about how quickly governments can respond (when they have to) by looking at how the British Government prepared for the impacts war have on food production.

In April 1936, with war against Germany a possibility but by no means a certainty, an Act of Parliament set up two committees: one was commissioned to design and prepare a scheme of food rationing, and the other to propose the commodities to be given priority in a programme of storing food. This led to the creation of the Food (Defence Plans) Department in the Borad of Trade, which became the driving force in preparing the food sector for war. Even so, Alan Wilt argues, it was not until 1940 that the government produced  a long-term policy. Committees were set up in 476 districts nationwide to co-ordinate the reorientation of agriculture. As well as attempting to increase levels of stored food, increasing home food production became a major concern. In 1936, two-thirds of Britain's food was imported and much of the nation's productive land was under pasture.

By 1944 the amount of land under cultivation had increased from 12.9 million acres in 1939 to 19.9 million, food production had risen 91% and in effect Britain was able to feed itself for approximately 160 days a year rather than the 120 days it had been in 1939. Food imports to the UK halved between 1939 and 1944. Local authorities set up horticultural committees to advice people on growing food, complemented by a huge programme of promoting the virtues of thrift and aconomy, as well as teaching practical skills. Some of the posters produced at the time are great examples of how to promote conservation, frugality and food production.

In 1942, Bristol (for example) had 15.000 allotments, and over half the nation's manual workers had en allotment of garden, producing around 10% of the nations food. People sometimes remark that during the war, allotments and back gardens 'only' produced 10% of the national diet, but the important point is that the 10% it produced was the 10% that kept the nation healthy. While agriculture grew the carbohydrates and the fats, it was the back gardens that produced most of the fresh fruit and vegetables.

Food rationing was introduced on January 8th 1940, and initially applied only to bacon, butter and sugar, before bering expanded to cover most foods (apart from fish and chips!) as well as fuel and clothing. One of the successes ot rationing was that it rebalanced inequalities in diet. While the wealthy saw their diet restrained, for the poor, particularly in industrial centres, diet improved significantly from the pre-war years. Total food consumtion fell 11% by 1944, as did meat consumption. Infant mortality rates also fell, and arguably the UK's general state of health was never better, before or since.

In terms of car use, petrol rationing, introduced in 1939, ws restricted to 1,800 miles per year for non-essential users, then gradually reduced until 1942 when individuual allocations were abolished. Between 1938 and 1944 there was a 95% drop in the use of cars in the UK.

Much can be learned from the experience of World War II regading how governments prepare for such a transition. The British Government was able, between 1936 when the Food (Defence Plans) Department was set up within the Borad of Trade and 1939 when the war began, to co-ordinate a response which was able (just) to support the nation. The most important lesson from the war years, accoring to Andrew Simms, is that 'when governments really want to, they can do almost anything, including good things.'

Clearly peak oil and climate change have yet to engender in the population or within government a sense of urgency anywhere near that of a Nazi invasion. However, as the Hirsch Report states, by the time a government  considers it politcitally expedient to take the scale of action prompted by peak oil, it is tto late. In terms of the model in Figure 8, the response during World War II was arguable closest to Heinberg's 'Power Down', although the governments emphasis on local action and reskilling places it further round towards his 'Building Lifeboats'. Alongside the war effort, the building of resilience became a national priority, and was actively encouraged and facilitated by national government."